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Abstract
Economic interdependence of heterogeneous habit forming consumers is ex-
amined by using a two-country model. Due to endogenous interest rate
adjustments, consumption-habit dynamics in one country are affected by the
other country’s habits and preferences. To characterize the interactive dy-
namics, we construct an aggregate world felicity function from individual
countries’ felicity functions and introduce a global aggregate habit capital,
defined as the sum of individual countries’ habit capitals. External indebt-
edness depends crucially on international differences in habit-adjusted dis-
posable income less habitual living standard. The international average of,
and difference in, the strength of habit formation play a key role in macro-
economic adjustment and the effects of fiscal policies. An increase in fiscal
spending in one country can make that country better off, and the neighbor
worse off, due to intertemporal terms-of-trade effects.
JEL Classification Numbers: F41, D90.
Keywords: Habit formation, two-country model, fiscal policy.
1 Introduction
An important stylized fact is that consumers’ habit forming behavior has a
significant effect on intertemporal choices, and hence various macroeconomic
phenomena (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane 1999, Carroll et al. 2000, Fuhrer
2000, Boldrin et al. 2001, Díaz et al. 2003). Accordingly, there have been
numerous attempts to better understand open macroeconomic phenomena
by incorporating habit formation. For example, by introducing consumers’
habit-persistent behavior to small-country models, Mansoorian (1993a, b)
and Ikeda and Gombi (1999) derive its implications for current account dy-
namics and macroeconomic policies. Amongst others, Gruber (2002) pro-
vides empirical support to an “intertemporal current account model” with
habit formation as explaining the actual current account behavior of the G-7
countries.
However, in the existing studies, including those small-country analyses,
habit formation is examined within the representative-agent framework, in
which consumers’ interactions due to pecuniary externalities are completely
neglected. When the interest rate is endogenously determined in a heteroge-
neous agent, general equilibrium setting, one consumer’s (or country’s) habit
forming behavior is affected by other consumers’ (or countries’) habits and
preferences. It has a particular importance to examine how this produces
different results from those the literature has predicted using small-country
and/or representative-agent models. The analysis would enable us to address
how habit formation in consumption affects each consumer’s (country’s) long-
run indebtedness and the transmission mechanism of various policies.
This paper presents a tractable two-country world economy model with
heterogeneous habit forming consumers. The purposes of the paper are: (i)
to analyze interactive habit forming consumer behavior in a world economy;
(ii) to examine long-run external indebtedness; and (iii) to address how fis-
cal policies in one country affect the two countries’ consumptions, wealth
holdings, and welfare levels. Devereux and Shi (1991) examine similar issues
using a two-country model with variable discount rates and capital accumu-
lation. At the cost of assuming away capital accumulation, our main interest
is to focus on habit formation as a more empirically relevant component of
the process of macroeconomic adjustment.
Under habit formation, it is well known that consumption dynamics de-
pend crucially on intertemporal complementarities induced by the prefer-
ences for habits. For example, when the marginal utility of consumption
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is strongly and positively related to habits, which Ryder and Heal (1973)
designate adjacent complementarity, optimum consumption is tied tightly to
and comoves positively with current habits. In this case, the typical open
economy implication is that when a negative income shock occurs, consumers
desave to maintain the present consumption level at the habitual standard,
which causes a deterioration in the current account (see, e.g., Mansoorian
1993a, b). By contrast, when there are heterogeneous consumers or coun-
tries, the behavior of individual consumers is affected by other consumers’
habits and preferences, as well as their own, due to interest rate adjustments.
Equilibrium intertemporal complementarity in consumption can thus differ
from what is defined by individual consumers’ subjective preferences. Our
main interest is to address how equilibrium intertemporal complementarity
in consumption is determined under international interdependence, thereby
adding new insights to the macroeconomic implications of habit formation.
To examine habit forming consumer behavior in the interdependent world
economy, we propose to reduce the general equilibrium dynamic model in
two ways. First, we construct a world felicity function from both coun-
tries’ felicity functions. One appealing aspect of this approach is the ability
to thereby characterize intertemporal complementarities in each country’s
equilibrium consumption in a similar way as in a small-country case. Even
though habit preferences in one country display distant (resp. adjacent) com-
plementarities, its equilibrium consumption behavior may exhibit adjacent
(resp. distant) complementarities. A corollary is that even if one country
has no preference for habits, the time series of consumption rates will display
habit-persistent patterns.
Second, we define an aggregate habit capital as the sum of individual
countries’ habit capitals. When aggregate output is constant, the aggregate
habit capital is also constant since, from the market clearing condition, it
equals aggregate output. When aggregate output changes at a point in time
due to exogenous shocks, the aggregate habit formation affects consumption
dynamics as an additional dynamic source. The resultant consumption be-
havior in each country is then affected by the aggregate habit capital, as well
as its own habit capital.
Long-run external indebtedness is characterized by defining the effective
disposable income that can be allocated for saving under habit formation as
surplus income. It is shown that a country is more likely to be a long-run
creditor the larger surplus income it has. Surplus income depends on dis-
posable income (i.e., output income less government spending), the initial
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stock of habit capital, and the strength of adjacent complementarity. When
a country’s disposable income is larger (resp. smaller) than its habitual con-
sumption level, we show that the country has larger (resp. smaller) surplus
income and hence is more likely to be a creditor (debtor), the stronger ad-
jacent complementarity it exhibits. This result is shown to be consistent
with Devereux and Shi’s (1991) proposition that a country tends to be a
long-run creditor the more patience it has. The novelty of this paper is that
which country is more patient depends on the relative strengths of adjacent
complementarity and how much greater disposable income than the habitual
consumption standard they have.1
We address macroeconomic adjustments in response to an increase in
country H’s fiscal spending financed with lump-sum taxes. The consumption
dynamics in a country are governed by the aggregate habit capital, in addi-
tion to its own habit capitals. The relation between the equilibrium consump-
tion and these habit capitals depends on the international average of, and
difference in, intertemporal complementarities. As shown in the literature
(see, e.g., Mansoorian 1993a, b), in the small-country case negative income
shocks, such as an increase in fiscal spending, necessarily lowers both ini-
tial and steady-state consumption levels; and decreases (resp. increases) net
foreign assets under adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity. By assuming
that the initial holding of net foreign assets, and hence the income re-transfer
effect due to interest rate changes are negligible, we show that an increase
in a country’s fiscal spending (i) can increase the initial or steady-state con-
sumption level of that country, with the other country’s consumption being
crowded out; (ii), as in the small country case, necessarily worsens (resp.
improves) the steady-state external asset position if the country’s preference
displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, irrespective of the other
country’s preferences; and (iii) has long-run and short-run spill-over effects on
the other country’s consumption, depending crucially on whether the policy
implementing country displays adjacent or distant complementarity.
With non-negligible initial net foreign assets, an increase in fiscal spend-
ing induces additional income effects by changing the world interest rate.
Even though fiscal spending is assumed to generate no direct utility, it is
shown, as an important welfare implication, that due to the intertemporal
1For the effect of habit formation on wealth distribution, see Díaz et al. (2003). They
show that habit formation decreases wealth inequality by raising wealth poor consumers’s
precautionary savings more than wealth rich ones’.
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terms-of-trade effect, an increase in fiscal spending financed by lump-sum
taxation can benefit the policy implementing country and harm the neigh-
boring country. This is an intertemporal version of (reversed) “immiseriz-
ing growth” discussed by, e.g., Bhagwati (1958) and Brecher and Bhagwati
(1982).
By using a two-country model, Bianconi (2003) exhibits the possibility
that an increase in fiscal spending has a reversed immiserizing growth effect
due to changes in the intratemporal terms of trade. He shows that an increase
in a country’s fiscal spending financed by capital taxation contracts the pro-
duction frontier in that country, and thereby appreciates the real exchange
rate, which can improve the asset position and the welfare level. However,
this reversed immiserizing growth effect cannot take place when government
spending is financed by a lump-sum tax, and/or when there is only one con-
sumption good (see Bianconi 2003, p.26). By contrast, fiscal spending in our
habit forming economy can make the policy implementing country better
off by improving the intertemporal terms of trade, even when the policy is
financed by lump-sum taxation in a single good economy.2
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we
present a two-country model. In Section 3, we examine equilibrium dynamics
of consumption, the interest rate, and net foreign assets. Section 4 analyzes
the effects of an increase in one country’s fiscal spending. In Section 5, welfare
enhancing government spending is discussed. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider a two-country world economy composed of home and foreign coun-
tries. Each country is populated with infinitely lived identical agents. The
representative agents in home and foreign countries are referred to as con-
sumers H and F, respectively. They consume a single consumption good and
hold wealth in the form of bonds. Both goods and bonds are assumed to
be costlessly traded in international markets. For brevity, the representative
agents H and F are assumed to be endowed with constant amounts of output
2The other literature concerning two-country dynamic models include Turnovsky and
Bianconi (1992), Kalayalcin (1996), and Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997), which focus
on supply side adjustments such as capital accumulation and/or leisure/labor choice. See
also Ikeda and Ono (1991) for an analysis of non-monotonic multi-country dynamics under
heterogeneous consumer preferences.
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y and y∗, respectively. Throughout the paper, the foreign country’s variables
are represented with superscript asterisks.
Consumption forms habits. Letting z(∗)t represent the time-t habit, we
specify z(∗)t as the average of the past consumption rates c
(∗)
s , s 5 t: z(∗)t =
α
R t
−∞ c
(∗)
s exp (−α (t− s)) ds, or equivalently
z˙
(∗)
t = α
³
c
(∗)
t − z
(∗)
t
´
, (1)
where x˙ represents the time derivative of variable x and α represents the
discount rate for past consumption rates. We assume that consumers in both
countries have the common discount rate α for past consumption rates. This
enables us to obtain the tractable dynamics of a two-country equilibrium.
Consumers H and F have different preferences over consumption and
habits. Consumer H’s preferences are specified as
U0 =
Z ∞
0
u(ct, zt) exp (−θt)dt, (2)
where θ represents the subjective discount rate, which is assumed constant.
Following Ryder and Heal (1973), function u is assumed to satisfy the follow-
ing regularity conditions: (C1) uc > 0; (C2) uz 5 0; (C3) uc (c, c)+uz (c, c) >
0; (C4) u is concave in (c, z) ; (C5) limc→0 uc (c, z) =∞ uniformly in z; and
(C6) limc→0 [uc (c, c) + uz (c, c)] =∞. Consumer F’s utility U∗0 is specified in
the same way.
Due to habit formation, consumer preferences are intertemporally depen-
dent. Within the representative agent framework, Ryder and Heal (1973)
characterize the resulting intertemporal complementarities in consumption
by adjacent and distant complementarities: With adjacent complementar-
ity, an increase in today’s habits increases the marginal utility of today’s
consumption more than it increases marginal disutility of habits, thereby
enlarging today’s optimal consumption. Under distant complementarity, an
increase in today’s habits increases marginal disutility of habits so much that
it reduces today’s consumption rate. We apply this idea to characterize each
country’s preferences: Consumer H’s preference is said to display adjacent
(distant) complementarity when ucz (c, c) + αθ+2αuzz (c, c) > (<)0. Similarly,
adjacent and distant complementarities in country F are defined in terms of
u∗. In the case of the representative agent economy, the intertemporal com-
plementarities displayed by consumers’ preferences definitely determine the
equilibrium dynamics (see, e.g., Ryder and Heal 1973 and Ikeda and Gombi
5
1999). In contrast, when the economy consists of heterogeneous agents, as in
the present case, pecuniary externalities through markets divert each agent’s
consumption saving behavior from what is predicted from each agent’s own
preference, as shown in the following section.
To ensure the steady state, let us assume that
θ = θ∗.
Unlike in the single agent model, the interest rate r can deviate from this
subjective discount rate.
Let bt denote net foreign assets held by consumer H. The flow budget
constraint for consumer H is given by
b˙t = rtbt + y − ct − τ , (3)
where τ represents a lump-sum tax levied by the government in country H.
Given the initial values (b0, z0) , consumer H chooses C0 = {ct, bt, zt}∞t=0 so
as to maximize (2) subject to: (i) the flow budget constraint (3); (ii) the
formation of consumption habits (1); and (iii) the transversality conditions.
Letting λt (= 0) be the shadow price of savings and ξt(5 0) that of habit
formation, the optimal conditions are given by
uc (c, z) = λt − αξt, (4)
λ˙t = (θ − rt)λt, (5)
ξ˙t = (θ + α) ξt − uz (ct, zt) , (6)
together with (1), (3), and the transversality conditions for bt and zt. Con-
sumer F’s behavior can be specified in exactly the same way.
The governments in the two countries follow the balanced budget princi-
ple. Their fiscal spendings g and g∗ equal tax revenues from lump-sum taxes
τ and τ ∗, respectively. By substituting this into (3) we obtain the balance of
payment equation,
b˙t = rtbt + y − ct − g. (7)
The model is closed by introducing the market clearing conditions:
ct + c
∗
t = Y (≡ y + y∗ − g − g∗) , (8)
bt + b
∗
t = 0, (9)
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where Y represents the disposable aggregate income. By Walras’ law, these
are not independent: (9) together with (7) and the corresponding constraint
for the foreign consumer imply (8). In sum, the equilibrium time path of
(bt, b
∗
t , ct, c
∗
t , zt, z
∗
t , rt,λt,λ
∗
t , ξt, ξ
∗
t ) is determined by equations (1), (4) through
(7), the corresponding equations for F, and the market equilibrium condition
(8) or (9).
3 Two-Country Equilibrium
3.1 The world felicity function
In this economy consumption dynamics in the two countries interact through
international market transactions. To ease the analysis, it is useful to define
aggregate habit capital Zt as
Zt ≡ zt + z∗t . (10)
Since α is assumed to be internationally identical, the dynamics of Zt can be
expressed from (1) and the market clearing condition (8) as
Z˙t = α (Y − Zt) . (11)
Note that this is an autonomous dynamic equation. If Zt and zt are given,
z∗t are determined from (10) as
z∗t = Zt − zt. (12)
By using (12), dynamics can be drastically simplified in the following
manner. Define σ as:
σ =
λ
λ∗
,
which is constant over time since λ˙t/λt = λ˙
∗
t/λ
∗
t from (5) (and the corre-
sponding equation for F). We then construct aggregate indices for (u, u∗)
and (ξ, ξ∗) as:
v (c, z, Z) ≡ u (c, z) + σu∗ (Y − c, Z − z) , (13)
ς ≡ ξ − σξ∗, (14)
where (8) and (12) are substituted.
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The new felicity function v represents an aggregate utility function with
weights being given by relative individual marginal utilities. We could call it
the world felicity function. The new shadow price ς is the weighted difference
in the shadow prices of habits. From the definition of v, ς could be regarded
as net marginal gains of transferring consumption capital from consumer F
to H. With these definitions, we can reduce the equilibrium dynamics of
consumption habits around a steady-state point as follows:
Proposition 1: In equilibrium, consumer H’s habits around a steady-state
point are governed by


z˙
ς˙
Z˙

 =

 M
−αvcz
vcc
vczvcz+vccvzz
vcc
0 0 −α




zˆ
ςˆ
Zˆ

 ; (15)
M =
Ã
−α
³
1 + vcz
vcc
´
− α2
vcc
(vcz)
2−vccvzz
vcc
θ + α(vcc+vcz)
vcc
!
,
where xˆ denotes deviations of variable x from its steady-state value x¯: xˆ ≡
xt − x¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Remark 1: The dynamic equation (15) is block recursive, where coefficient
matrixM for habit and its shadow price
³
zˆ, ζˆ
´
is exactly the same as in the
case of the small-country model (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999 and Mansoorian
1993a, b), except that v and ς represent the world average preferences, instead
of individual countries’ preferences.
Remark 2: As easily seen, Proposition 1 is an application of the second
theorem of welfare economics. Without any distortion, the Pareto optimal
resource allocation attained as a complete market equilibrium can be dupli-
cated as a solution to a social welfare maximization problem:
max U0 + βU
∗
0 ,
subject to Y = ct + c∗t , Zt = zt + z
∗
t , z˙t = α (ct − zt) ,
and Z˙t = α (Y − Zt) .
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Indeed, the corresponding Hamiltonian function,
Ht = u(ct, zt) + βu
∗(Y − ct, Zt − zt) + ς tα (ct − zt) + ιtα (Y − Zt) ,
produces the same optimal condition as in Proposition 1 when weight β is
set equal to σ.
Since the dynamic equation (11) of aggregate habit Z is autonomous, it is
noteworthy that, if the economy is initially in steady-state equilibrium, and
if the steady-state value of Z, which equals Y from (11), does not change, the
aggregate habit stays at value Y . In other words, in the absence of aggregate
income shocks, the aggregate habit dynamics degenerate at Z¯(= Y ), so that
the equilibrium dynamics in (15) are completely described by the
³
zˆ, ζˆ
´
dynamics, as in the small-country case. Note, however, that the transition
matrix here is defined in terms of the world felicity function.
3.2 Equilibrium dynamics
3.2.1 Habit and consumption
Dynamic system (15) has two stable roots:
ω ≡
θ −
q
(θ + 2α)2 − 4α (θ + 2α)Ω
2
(< 0) and − α, (16)
and one unstable root, which is conjugate with ω, where ω is a character-
istic root of M ; and Ω ≡ −
¡
vcz +
α
θ+2αvzz
¢
/vcc. In parallel with intertem-
poral complementarities with respect to the individual consumers’ prefer-
ences, Ω captures equilibrium intertemporal complementarities: we refer to
the world felicity function as displaying adjacent (distant) complementarity
when vcz (c, c) + αθ+2αvzz (c, c) > (<)0, i.e., Ω > (resp. <)0.
Let us introduce complementarity indices ΩH and ΩF for the individual
countries’ preferences, in parallel with Ω, as
ΩH ≡ −
µ
ucz +
α
θ + 2α
uzz
¶
/ucc and ΩF ≡ −
µ
u∗cz +
α
θ + 2α
u∗zz
¶
/u∗cc,
where, e.g., a positive ΩH represents adjacent (distant) complementarity for
H. The indices, ΩH and ΩF , capture the strength of habit formation of the
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individual consumers H and F. When ΩH is larger than ΩF , for example,
complementarity between consumption and habit is stronger for consumer H
than for consumer F.
Definition: Consumer H is more (less) in the habit of consuming than
consumer F when ΩH > (<)ΩF .
From the definition (13) of v, the intertemporal complementarities with
respect to the individual countries’ preferences can be related to those pre-
vailing in equilibrium by:
Ω = εΩH + (1− ε)ΩF ; (17)
ε ≡ ucc
ucc + σu∗cc
.
Therefore, adjacent (distant) complementarity in both countries implies ad-
jacent (distant) complementarity in the two-country equilibrium. When the
individual countries’ preferences display different intertemporal complemen-
tarities, equilibrium intertemporal complementarity is determined by the rel-
ative strength of intertemporal complementarities regarding the individual
preferences.
As shown in Appendix B.1, the saddle plane governed by the two stable
roots are expressed as
z˙ = ωzˆ − (ω + α)(1− δ)Zˆ, (18)
Z˙ = −αZˆ, (19)
where
δ ≡ εΩH/Ω.
By equating (18) to (1), the consumption dynamics are given by
cˆ =
µ
ω + α
α
¶³
zˆ − (1− δ)Zˆ
´
. (20)
Differentiate this by t and substitute (1), (19), and (20) successively into
the result. Then, by taking (8) into account, we obtain the motion of each
country’s consumption as
c˙ = ωcˆ, (21)
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c˙∗ = ωcˆ∗. (22)
Irrespective of the second-order habit dynamics of (18) and (19), therefore,
the equilibrium consumption dynamics are of the first order. Equations (1)
and (21) jointly govern the equilibrium dynamics of (c, z); and equations (1)
and (22) do dynamics of (c∗, z∗). The resulting phase diagrams are illustrated
in the (c, z) and (c∗, z∗) planes of Figure 1.
To understand the consumption-habit dynamics given by (20), consider
first the case without any aggregate income shocks, Zˆ = 0, in which case the
equilibrium cˆ-zˆ relationship reduces to:
cˆt =
µ
ω + α
α
¶
zˆt and cˆ∗t =
µ
ω + α
α
¶
zˆ∗t . (23)
From equations (16) through (23), when the world felicity function displays
adjacent complementarity (Ω > 0), ω + α is positive and thus the stable
arms (23) are positively sloping, whereas under distant complementarity with
respect to v (Ω < 0) the trajectories have a negative slope with negative
ω+α. That is, in equilibrium, both countries experience positive or negative
comovements between consumption and habits, i.e., dc(∗)t /dz
(∗)
t > (<) 0, as
the world felicity function displays adjacent or distant complementarity. This
property is the same as in the small-country case except that intertemporal
complementarities here are defined in terms of the world felicity function,
instead of each country’s felicity function.
When aggregate habit capital Zˆ varies, the equilibrium consumption dy-
namics depend on Zˆ. The second term of (20) captures the effect of an
increase in Zˆ for given zˆt. Alternatively, we substitute the definition of δ,
(17), and (10) successively into (20) to obtain
cˆ =
µ
ω + α
αΩ
¶¡
εΩH zˆ − (1− ε)ΩF zˆ∗
¢
. (24)
Since (ω + α) /Ω is positive irrespective of whether the world felicity function
displays adjacent or distant complementarity,3 this reveals that the sign of cˆ
is determined by the relative magnitudes of εΩH zˆ and (1− ε)ΩF zˆ∗. cˆ can
thus be negative even when εΩH zˆ is positive if (1− ε)ΩF zˆ∗ is large enough.
Suppose that both the countries’ preferences display adjacent complemen-
tarities, ΩH ,ΩF > 0. If zˆ and zˆ∗ are positive, each country’s consumer plans
3When Ω = 0, we have ω+α = 0. It can be shown from (16) that lim
Ω→0
(ω+α)/ Ω = α.
11
to consume a larger quantity than the steady-state level. Since a positive
cˆ∗ implies a negative cˆ in equilibrium, the sign of equilibrium cˆ should be
negative when (1− ε)ΩF zˆ∗ is larger than εΩH zˆ. As will be shown later, the
market will be cleared by a rise in the interest rate.
It is important to note that even if one country has no preference for
habits, the time series of consumption rates will display seemingly habit-
persistent patterns. For example, suppose that country H has no preference
for habits: uz = 0, uzz = 0, ucz = 0, and hence ΩH = 0. From (20), the
equilibrium consumption of country H still depends on its own habit capital,
with root ω being determined solely by country F’s preferences for habits (see
(16) and (17)). Given that c is related to c∗ by market equilibrium condition
(8), and that z is related to z∗ and Z by (10), the dependence of c∗ on z∗
due to country F’s habit preferences induces the dependence of c on (z, Z)
even though c does not depend directly on z.
3.2.2 The interest rate
As is proven by Appendix B.2, the interest rate dynamics are given by
rˆ = κ
¡
ΩH − ΩF
¢
zˆ +
"
(1− ε)ΩF
¡
ΩF − ΩH
¢
κ
Ω
+
ΩHΩF
Ω
η
#
Zˆ, (25)
where κ and η are defined as
κ ≡ ωuccu
∗
cc (θ + 2α)
λ∗ (α+ θ − ω) (ucc + σu∗cc)
(> 0) ; η ≡ − αuccu
∗
cc
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
(> 0) .
Equation (25) reveals that the equilibrium interest rate is driven by coun-
try H’s habit capital zˆ and the aggregate habit capital Zˆ. Since zˆ − zˆ∗ =
2zˆ−Zˆ, a change in zˆ with a given Zˆ can be taken as a change in difference be-
tween the two countries’ habit capitals zˆ and zˆ∗. Equation (25) thus implies
that the dynamics of rˆ rely on the difference between and the sum of the two
countries’ habit capitals. The dynamics of habit capitals z and Z are jointly
generated by (18) and (19). It is easy to show that the resulting dynamics of
the interest rate can be non-monotonic. As seen from (25), the interest rate
also depends on the difference in the two countries’ intertemporal preferences
ΩH and ΩF as well as on the average Ω of the two.
It is too complicated to analyze (25) directly and thereby show how
these factors determine the equilibrium interest rate. Instead, we focus on
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three special cases: (i) the aggregate habit stock stays constant at the initial
steady-state value, i.e., Zˆt = 0 for all t; (ii) the two countries’ preferences ex-
hibit identical degrees of adjacent complementarity, i.e., ΩH = ΩF = Ω;4 and
the preferences have no intertemporal dependence on average in the steady
state, i.e., Ω = 0 (or equivalently ω = −α) and hence ΩF = − ε
1−εΩ
H .
Case (i): Zˆt = 0 for all t. In this case, equation (25) reduces to:
rˆ = κ
¡
ΩH − ΩF
¢
zˆ. (26)
This reveals that the equilibrium interest rate depends crucially on interna-
tional difference zˆ in habit capital through international difference ΩH−ΩF in
intertemporal complementarity. The interest rate positively (negatively) co-
moves with zˆ when consumer H is more (less) in the habit of consuming than
consumer F.5 To understand this relationship, suppose that consumer H’s
preferences display distant complementarity (ΩH < 0) whereas country F’s
display adjacent complementarity (ΩF > 0); and that z (t) < z¯, and hence,
from (12), z∗ (t) > z¯∗. With distant complementarity for consumer H’s pref-
erence, he or she would consume more now than in the future steady state if
r equaled θ. Consumer F would also consume more now than in the future
due to adjacent complementarity. This would give rise to excess demand in
the “present good” market. The market clearing r (t) should thus be higher
than its steady-state level θ. By the same reasoning, in the case of adjacent
complementarity for country H with distant complementarity prevailing in
country F, r (t) is positively correlated with z (t). As shown later, the dy-
namics of zˆ are monotonically driven by stable root ω when Zˆt = 0. From
(26), therefore, the interest rate in this case displays monotonic dynamics,
r˙ = ωrˆ.
4This case takes place (i) when the values of Ωi (i = H,F ) happen to be the same
in steady state; (ii) when the felicity functions take quadratic forms with constant and
internationally identical second-order derivatives; or (iii) when the two countries are per-
fectly identical with respect to preferences, endowments, and the initial stocks of habit
capitals and net foreign assets. In case (iii), although the Ωi values are globally identical,
we cannot examine the case of non-zero b0.
5If country H is identical to country F (ΩH = ΩF ), or if country F is small in the sense
that λ∗ is infinitely large (λ∗ → ∞), for which case κ is zero, the interest rate dynamics
degenerate at θ as in the small-country case (e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999).
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Case (ii): ΩH = ΩF = Ω. When the two countries’ preferences exhibit the
identical degrees of adjacent complementarity, the equilibrium interest rate
is determined from (25) as
rˆ = ηΩZˆ, (27)
implying that the aggregate habit stock and the average preferences play
crucial roles in this case. Suppose that the current aggregate habit stock
is larger than its steady-state level, Z (t) > Z¯. Then, if consumers exhibit
adjacent (distant) complementarity, i.e., Ω > 0 (Ω < 0), ceteris paribus there
prevails excess demand (supply) in the present good market. This renders
the equilibrium interest rate higher (lower) than its steady-state interest rate
θ. The equilibrium interest rate positively (negatively) comoves with the
aggregate habit stock, which exhibits monotonic motions with stable root
−α (see (19)). The resulting dynamics of r are given explicitly by
r˙ = −αrˆ. (28)
Case (iii): Ω = 0 (or equivalently ω = −α). From (25), the equilibrium
interest rate in case (iii) is given by
rˆ = εκΩH
µ
1
ε
zˆ − 1
1− ε zˆ
∗
¶
. (29)
The two-country’s habit stock zˆ and zˆ∗ affect the interest rate in the op-
posite direction. When ΩH is positive (negative), for example, a positive zˆ,
ceteris paribus, causes excess demand (supply) for the present good. Since
ΩF = − ε
1−εΩ
H is negative in this case, a positive zˆ∗, ceteris paribus, causes
excess supply. The sign of rˆ is determined by the relative magnitudes of the
countervailing effects. Since from (18) and (19) zˆ and zˆ∗ are generated by
z˙ = −αzˆ and z˙∗ = −αzˆ∗, respectively, the law of motion of the interest rate
is given by (28) again.
3.2.3 Net foreign assets
The transition dynamics of net foreign assets also depend on the property of
the world felicity function and international heterogeneity in habit formation.
As shown by Appendix B.3, by linearizing (7) and substituting (24) and (25)
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into the result, we can obtain
bˆt =
1
θ − ω
µ
ω + α
α
− a1b0
¶
zˆt +
·
−(ω + α) (1− ε)Ω
F
α (θ − ω)Ω
+
b0
θ + α
½
a1 (1− ε)ΩF (ω + α)
(θ − ω)Ω − a2
¾¸
Zˆt, (30)
where a1 and a2 represent the coefficients of zˆ and Zˆ in (25):
a1 = κ
¡
ΩH − ΩF
¢
,
a2 =
(1− ε)ΩF
¡
ΩF − ΩH
¢
κ
Ω
+
ΩHΩF
Ω
η,
respectively.
Two habit stocks zˆt and Zˆt affect bˆt by changing consumption and the
interest rate. Changes in the habit stocks affect consumption through (20)
and thereby influence the accumulation of net foreign assets. This effect
is expressed by the terms without b0 in (30), which depend on ω + α, i.e.,
whether the world felicity function displays distant or adjacent complemen-
tarity. The habit stocks also affect the interest rate by (25). The resulting
change in interest income alters the time profile of net foreign assets. The
effect is captured by the terms associated with b0 in (30). These income re-
transfer effects through interest rate changes may well have various adverse
effects. To avoid analytical complexity, we get rid of the effects by assuming
that the initial amounts b0 of net foreign assets for both countries are negli-
gible, as in Devereux and Shi (1991). The implications of a nonzero b0 will
be discussed briefly in Section 5 and in Appendix C.
Assumption 1: b∗0 ≈ 0.
With Assumption 1, equation (30) reduces to
bˆt =
ω + α
α (θ − ω)
³
zˆt − (1− δ) Zˆt
´
.
Combining (20) with the above equation yields the saddle arm in the (b, c)
plane:
bˆ (t) =
1
θ − ω cˆ (t) . (31)
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Since from (21) the dynamics of cˆ (t) are monotonic, those of bˆ (t) are also
monotonic. Figure 1 depicts the saddle arm in the (b, c) plane as upward
sloping schedule DD0.
3.3 Steady state
From (1), (5), (7), and (30), the steady-state equilibrium, (c¯, c¯∗, z¯, z¯∗, Z¯, b¯, b¯∗, r¯),
is determined by:
c¯ = z¯, c¯∗ = z¯∗, (32)
c¯+ c¯∗ = Y = Z¯, (33)
r¯ = θ, (34)
r¯b¯+ y = c¯+ g, (35)
b¯ =
ω + α
α (θ − ω) (z¯ − z0)−
(ω + α) (1− ε)ΩF
α (θ − ω)Ω
¡
Z¯ − Z0
¢
, (36)
b¯ = −b¯∗. (37)
together with (8), (9) and (12), where (36) comes from (30) evaluated at
t = 0.
By substituting (32) and (34) into (35), we obtain
θb¯+ y = z¯ + g. (38)
Combining (33) and (36) yields
b¯ =
ω + α
α (θ − ω) (z¯ − z0)−
(ω + α) (1− ε)ΩF
α (θ − ω)Ω (Y − Z0) . (39)
Equations (38) and (39) jointly determines
¡
b¯, z¯
¢
. Figure 2 depicts the de-
termination of
¡
b¯, z¯
¢
: schedule BB0 depicted with a positive slope represents
(38), whereas schedule SS0, which represents (39), can be either positively
or negatively sloping as the world felicity function displays either adjacent
or distant complementarity. Even when schedule SS0 is positively sloping,
schedule BB0 is always steeper than SS0. The steady-state equilibrium point¡
b¯, z¯
¢
is given by the intersection point E of the two schedules. Given this,¡
c¯, c¯∗, z¯∗, Z¯
¢
is determined by (32) and (33); and b¯∗ by (37).
From linearity of (38) and (39), we can examine the determinants of the
long-run external asset distribution by solving the two equations for b¯ as
b¯ = − ω + α
ω (θ + α)Ω
(I − I∗) , (40)
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where
I = εΩH
µ
y − g + ω (θ + α)
α (θ − ω)z0
¶
,
I∗ = (1− ε)ΩF
µ
y∗ − g∗ + ω (θ + α)
α (θ − ω)z
∗
0
¶
.
Roughly, terms I and I∗ represent disposable incomes y(∗)− g (∗)in excess of
habitual consumption levels ω(θ+α)α(θ−ω)z
(∗)
0 , adjusted by the relative strengths of
adjacent complementarities εΩH and (1− ε)ΩF . For short, we call I and I∗
surplus incomes.
Definition: I and I∗are surplus incomes.
Since (ω + α) /Ω is positive, (40) implies that b¯ is positively proportionate
to the international difference I − I∗ in surplus income:
Proposition 2: With Assumption 1, long-run net foreign assets in one coun-
try are positively proportionate to the difference of the country’s surplus in-
come from the other country’s.
Proposition 2 implies the four parts of Corollary 1 below. First, whether
country H is a creditor or debtor depends crucially on the relative magni-
tudes of surplus incomes I and I∗: b¯ T 0⇔ I T I∗. Suppose that a country’s
disposable income exceeds the habitual consumption level. Then, if its prefer-
ences are of adjacent complementarity, ceteris paribus it saves the excessive
income and thereby holds positive external assets in the long run. When
its preferences are of distant complementarity, in contrast, ceteris paribus it
consumes more than the excessive income to hold negative external assets
in the long run. The same is true for the other country. In equilibrium,
the country with a larger (resp. smaller) surplus income accumulates (resp.
decumulates) external assets.
Second, from (40), the effects of increases in fiscal spending are obtained
as
db¯
dg
= −db¯
∗
dg
=
εΩH
(θ + α)ω
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶
, (41)
db¯∗
dg∗
= − db¯
dg∗
=
(1− ε)ΩF
(θ + α)ω
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶
, (42)
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implying that an increase in a country’s fiscal spending reduces (resp. en-
larges) its long-run external assets and hence enlarges (resp. reduces) the
other country’s when consumer preferences in the policy implementing coun-
try display adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity. For example, an in-
crease in g reduces or enlarges b¯ as ΩH is positive or negative. Irrespective
of the two-country setting, note that this property is the same as in the
small-country case.
Third, a permanent income transfer from country H to country F, −dy =
dy∗ > 0, affects each country’s external asset position as
db¯
dy
¯¯¯¯
dy=−dy∗
= − db¯
∗
dy
¯¯¯¯
dy=−dy∗
= − ω + α
ω(α+ θ)
. (43)
It follows that the income transfer reduces or enlarges country H’s net foreign
assets as the world felicity function exhibits adjacent or distant complemen-
tarity.
Fourth, the initial stock z0 of habit capital has qualitatively the same
implication for the external asset position b¯ as fiscal spending g. These
discussions can be summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: With Assumption 1,
(i) a country is a creditor (resp. debtor) in steady state when its surplus
income is larger (resp. smaller) than the other country’s: b¯ T 0⇔ I T I∗;
(ii) an increase in a country’s fiscal spending reduces (resp. enlarges) its long-
run external assets and hence enlarges (resp. reduces) the other country’s
when consumer preferences in the policy implementing country display adja-
cent (resp. distant) complementarity: db¯/dg = −db¯∗/dg S 0⇔ ΩH T 0;
(iii) a permanent income transfer from country H to country F reduces (resp.
enlarges) H’s net foreign assets when the world felicity function exhibits adja-
cent (resp. distant) complementarity: db¯/dy
¯¯
dy=−dy∗ = − db¯
∗/dy
¯¯
dy=−dy∗ T
0⇔ Ω T 0; and
(iv) the initial stocks of habit capitals have qualitatively the same implication
for external asset positions as fiscal spending.
Remark 3: Devereux and Shi (1991) show that a country will tend to be a
long-run creditor the more patient it is and/or the greater is its disposable
income. Our results, especially Corollary 1 (i), can be related to their discus-
sion as follows. Starting from the initial situation that disposable incomes
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equal the habitual consumption standards in the two countries, consider a
marginal increase in country H’s disposable income, making its disposable in-
come greater than the habitual consumption standard. As conjectured from
the small-country analysis (and as will be indeed shown later), when country
H’s preferences are more of adjacent complementarity than country F’s, then,
in response to the positive income shock, country H is more reluctant to in-
crease consumption in the short run and hence more likely to be a creditor in
the long run. In this case, country H can be regarded as more patient than F
in the short run and, consistent with Devereux and Shi (1991), the more pa-
tient country becomes a long-run creditor. What differs from their discussion
is that which country is more patient depends on the relative strengths of
adjacent complementarity and how much greater disposable income than the
habitual consumption standard they have. To see this, consider a marginal
decrease in country H’s disposable income, in which case the new level of
disposable income is lower than the habitual consumption standard. When
country H’s preferences are more of adjacent complementarity than country
F’s, country H is more reluctant to decrease consumption in response to the
negative income shock and becomes a debtor in the long run. It is true that
the less patient country is a long-run debtor. In this case, however, it is
country H that is the less patient.
3.4 Welfare
From the linearized equilibrium dynamics obtained above, Appendix B.4
shows that the welfare levels of countries H and F are given by
U0 =
u (z¯, z¯)
θ
+
(ω + α)uc + αuz
α (θ − ω) (z0 − z¯)
− (ω + α) (1− ε)Ω
F
α(θ + α) (θ − ω)Ω [(θ + α)uc + αuz] (Z0 − Y ) , (44)
U∗0 =
u∗ (z¯∗, z¯∗)
θ
+
(ω + α)u∗c + αu
∗
z
α (θ − ω) (z
∗
0 − z¯∗)
− (ω + α) εΩ
H
α(θ + α) (θ − ω)Ω [(θ + α)u
∗
c + αu
∗
z] (Z0 − Y ) , (45)
respectively.
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4 Effects of government spending
Let us next consider an increase in fiscal spending g in country H, financed
by lump-sum taxes.6
4.1 Consumption and net foreign assets
As shown by Corollary 1(ii), an increase in country H’s fiscal spending reduces
or increases its own net foreign assets in steady states as its preferences
exhibit adjacent or distant complementarity, as in the small-country case
(e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999). The effect on the steady-state consumption
level is somewhat in contrast to the small-country case, where an increase in
g necessarily decreases c¯. From (8), (38) and (39), the effect on steady-state
consumption is obtained as follows:
dc¯
dg
=
dz¯
dg
= θ
db¯
dg
− 1 = εθΩ
H
(θ + α)ω
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶
− 1, (46)
dc¯∗
dg
= − εθΩ
H
(θ + α)ω
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶
S 0⇔ ΩH S 0. (47)
From (46), an increase in g decreases c¯ whenever ΩH is positive. When
ΩH is negative, however, c¯ can increase due to an increase in interest income
θb¯ in excess of the lump-sum tax increase if Ω = 0 and hence ΩF > 0, that is
if the world felicity function and hence consumer F’s felicity function exhibit
adjacent complementarities.7
6We could consider three types of shocks: a shock that affects both of the BB0 and
SS0 schedules in Figure 2 (e.g., an increase in fiscal spending in country H); one that
shifts the BB0 schedule, leaving the SS0 schedule (e.g., an income transfer between the
two counties, −dy = dy∗); and one that shifts the SS0 schedule, leaving BB0 unchanged
(e.g., productivity shocks dy∗ in country F). For the effects of income transfers, see Gombi
and Ikeda (2003). The effects of productivity shocks dy∗ in country F can be obtained
from the effects of fiscal spending in country H by replacing country H’s variables with
country F’s.
7Formally, from (17) and (46), we can obtain
dc¯
dg
> 0⇔ −1− εε Ω
F 5 ΩH < ω (1− ε) (θ + α)αε (θ − ω) Ω
F .
From this relation, it can be seen that necessary conditions for dc¯/dg to be positive are:
ΩH < 0, ΩF > 0, and Ω = 0 by noting that ω(1−ε)(θ+α)αε(θ−ω) T −1−εε ⇔ Ω T 0.
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Figure 3 illustrates the case that ΩH < 0;ΩF > 0; and Ω > 0, for which
case the slope of the SS0 schedule is positive but gentler than that of BB0.
An increase in g shifts both the schedules to the left. When the leftward shift
of schedule SS0 is larger or smaller than that of BB0, z¯ and hence c¯ decreases
or increases.
From (47), the spill-over effect on country F’s consumption c¯∗ depends
crucially on whether country H’s preferences display adjacent or distant com-
plementarity, ΩH T 0. This is because the effects on b¯ and hence on b¯∗ rely
crucially on the sign of ΩH . When country H’s preferences exhibit adjacent
complementarity (ΩH > 0), an increase in g decreases b¯, increases b¯∗ and
hence increases c¯∗, and vice versa.
From (20) and (46) the impact effect on country H’s consumption is
derived as
dc (0)
dg
=
εΩH
θ + α
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶
− 1. (48)
In the small-country case, consumption of the country plumps more or less
than its disposable income as the preferences exhibit distant or adjacent
complementarity (see, e.g., Ikeda and Gombi 1999). In the same way, (48)
implies that dc (0) /dg ≷ −1 ⇔ ΩH ≷ 0: when country H’s intertemporal
preference exhibits adjacent (or distant) complementarity ΩH > 0 (or ΩH <
0), H’s consumption does not plump (or plumps) more than its disposable
income on impact. Two points are noteworthy, however. First, the impact
effect given by (48) is that on equilibrium consumption, which reflects the
interest rate adjustment. Second, we cannot exclude the pathological case
that equilibrium consumption c (0) increases on impact when consumer H’s
preferences display strong adjacent complementarity.8
Given that dc (0) /dg ≷ −1 ⇔ ΩH ≷ 0, market-clearing condition (8)
implies that country F’s consumption decreases or increases as ΩH is positive
or negative. Formally, from (48) and (8), we obtain that
dc∗ (0)
dg
= − εΩ
H
θ + α
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶
S 0⇔ ΩH T 0. (49)
8Note from (46) and (49) that
dc (0)
dg
− dc¯
dg
=
εΩH
θ + α
µ
ω + α
Ω
¶µ
1− θω
¶
S 0⇔ ΩH S 0.
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Therefore, when H’s preferences display distant (or adjacent) complementar-
ity, country F’s consumption jumps up (or down) on impact. Comparing
(47) with (49) yields
dc∗ (0)
dg
S 0⇔ dc¯
∗
dg
T 0
³
⇔ ΩH T 0
´
,
implying that the impact effect of an increase in fiscal spending on country
F’s consumption is necessarily opposite to its steady-state effect. Since there
is no direct income shock in country F, any increases or decreases in c¯∗ should
be financed by increases or decreases in b¯∗, which are only brought about by
decreases or increases in c∗ (0) to cause current account surplus or deficits in
transition.
The transition dynamics are illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 by using the
phase diagrams introduced in Figure 1. Figure 4 treats the case in which
ΩH > 0, i.e., consumer H’s preferences are of adjacent complementarity.
From (41), an increase in g reduces b¯ and hence c¯ (see (46)). Although c (0)
may decrease or increase (see (48)), savings necessarily reduce to generate
the current account deficits, as in the case of adjacent complementarity in
small-country models. As c (0) decreases or increases, saddle arm DD0 in
the (b, c) plane shifts downward or upward. Net foreign assets b gradually
decumulate from b0 to b¯ along the new saddle arm, D1D01. Since b¯
∗(= −b¯)
increases, c¯∗ increases (see (47)). To realize this, c∗ (0) necessarily drops to
induce the current account surplus (see (49)). As depicted in the (z∗, c∗)
plane, the resulting transition dynamics of z∗ are non-monotonic: at the
earlier stage, following the discrete drop in c∗, z∗ decreases over time. As c∗
monotonically increases toward c¯∗, z∗ sooner or later stops decreasing and
starts rising toward z¯∗(= c¯∗).
When ΩH < 0, i.e., when consumer H’s preferences are of distant comple-
mentarity, an increase in g enlarges b¯(= −b¯∗) and decreases c¯∗. The effect on
c¯ is ambiguous because the increase in b¯ may increase the disposable income
in a steady state irrespective of the lump-sum tax increase. Figure 5 depicts
the normal case of a negative ΩH in which c¯ is reduced by the increase in g.
The impact on F’s consumption is positive, whereas that on H’s consumption
is negative.
The following point is noteworthy. By considering a temporary income
shock, Fuhrer (2000) shows that the habit formation model is useful to repli-
cate non-monotonic responses of consumption that characterize the aggregate
data. As shown above (see, e.g., Figures 4 and 5), even when the income
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shock is permanent, the short-run response of consumption can exceed, or
be opposite to, the long-run response. This implies that, in an interdepen-
dent economy, the habit model has a potential of explaining non-monotonic
responses of consumption even without temporariness of income shocks.
4.2 The interest rate
The effect on the interest rate can be computed by differentiating (25) with
respect to g and by substituting (46) into the result as
dr (0)
dg
=
αεu∗ccΩ
H
λ∗ (θ + α) (α+ θ − ω) (ucc + σu∗cc)Ω
©
ucc (ω − θ) (θ + 2α)ΩH
− {α (ω + α)ucc + (θ + α) (α+ θ − ω)σu∗cc}ΩF
ª
. (50)
Instead of discussing the general properties of this complex result, we restrict
our attention to the two special cases (ii) and (iii) discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Consider case (ii), in which consumer preferences exhibit identical degrees
of adjacent complementarity: ΩH = ΩF = Ω. Equation (50) then reduces to
dr (0)
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= ηΩ S 0⇔ Ω S 0. (51)
This implies that an increase in g raises (or lowers) r (0) as the world felicity
function displays adjacent (or distant) complementarity. Such a policy affects
the commodity market on both the supply and demand sides: it reduces the
supply of the good that can be absorbed by consumption; and it decreases
disposable income in country H. In the case of adjacent complementarity, the
decrease in disposable income would make the current consumption level in
country H lower, but not so much as the steady-state consumption level if the
interest rate is constant at θ. This means that there would be excess demand
in the current good market. To clear the market, the interest rate rises above
θ, which, in turn, decreases the aggregate consumption level to the lowered
aggregate supply of the good. Alternatively, when the world felicity function
exhibits distant complementarity, an increase in g produces excess supply in
the present good market, thereby lowering the interest rate. After the initial
response, the interest rate then monotonically converges toward θ as seen
from (28).
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In case (iii), in which Ω = 0 (or equivalently εΩH = − (1− ε)ΩF ), equa-
tion (50) is simplified to
dr (0)
dg
¯¯¯¯
Ω=0
=
κΩH
1− ε
µ
εθΩH
α+ θ
+ 1− ε
¶
= κΩH
µ
εθΩH
(1− ε) (α+ θ) + 1
¶
.
This implies that when ΩH > 0, an increase in g causes excess demand in
the present good market to raise the equilibrium interest rate, as in case (ii)
with a positive Ω. When country H’s preferences are of a moderate distant
complementarity, such that − (α+ θ) (1− ε) / (θε) < ΩH < 0, the interest
rate initially falls since an increase in g causes excess supply in the present
good market, as easily conjectured from the discussions in case (ii). Under
strong distant complementarity: ΩH < − (α+ θ) (1− ε) / (θε), in contrast,
the equilibrium interest rate is raised by the policy. Note that the condition
under which the paradoxical case occurs can be rewritten as9
ΩH < 0 and
dz¯
dg
¯¯¯¯
Ω=0
> −ε.
Even whenΩH < 0, therefore, the interest rate initially goes up if the decrease
in steady-state consumption is sufficiently small. In that case, due to distant
complementarity an initial decrease in consumption is so small that excess
demand prevails in the present market. From (28), monotonic transition
dynamics follow the initial response.
4.3 Welfare
Irrespective of how each country’s consumption responds over time, an in-
crease in government spending g necessarily reduces country H’s welfare. To
see this, we substitute (8) into (44) and (45), differentiate the results by g,
and incorporate (46) and (47). The results are simply given by
dU0
dg
= −λ
θ
(< 0) ,
9From (29), we can derive
dr (0)
dg
¯¯¯¯
Ω=0
= − κΩ
H
1− ε
µ
dz¯
dg
¯¯¯¯
Ω=0
+ ε
¶
.
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dU∗0
dg
= 0.
As in the case of income transfers, the increase in g harms country H’s
welfare by the amount equal to the present value of the marginal utility. The
marginal change in g, however, does not affect country F’s welfare in this
non-distortionary competitive equilibrium.10 However, these properties are
limited to the case of b0 = 0.
5 Welfare-enhancing fiscal spending: An im-
plication of b0 6= 0
We have so far assumed that b0 equals zero by Assumption 1. When b0 6= 0,
however, an increase in government spending g has additional welfare effects
by causing income re-transfers through interest rate changes, i.e., changes
in the intertemporal terms of trade. Even though government spending is
assumed to provide no direct utility, we shall show that an increase in g can
enhance country H’s welfare level due to favorable changes in the intertem-
poral terms of trade, i.e., rises (resp. falls) in the world interest rate if the
country is a creditor (resp. debtor).
Let us now abandon Assumption 1 to allow b0 to take a non-zero value.
For expository purposes, we focus on case (ii), ΩH = ΩF = Ω. As shown in
Appendix C, an increase in g affects country H’s welfare by
dU
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= −λ
θ
µ
1− θ
α+ θ
ηΩb0
¶
,
implying the increase in g improves country H’s welfare if θα+θηΩb0 > 1.
With a positive b0, the policy is welfare enhancing if Ω is a sufficiently large
positive number, i.e., if consumers’ preferences are of sufficiently strong ad-
jacent complementarity. Note that the term θα+θηΩb0 represents an income
re-distribution effect due to interest rate changes since, as derived in Appen-
dix C, the effect on the interest rate is given by
dr (0)
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
T 0⇔ Ω T 0.
10The same result can be obtained from Bianconi and Turnovsky (1997, p.80) by assum-
ing that g does not generate direct utility and that there is no initial external indebtedness.
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With adjacent complementarity (Ω > 0), ceteris paribus an increase in g
causes excess demand for the present good, raises the interest rate, and en-
larges the disposable income and the welfare level if b0 is positive and large.
This is an intertemporal version of (reversed) immiserizing growth discussed
by the trade theory (e.g., Bhagwati 1958, Brecher and Bhagwati 1982): a
creditor country, i.e., an exporter of the present good, can be better (resp.
worse) off due to intertemporal terms-of-trade improvements (resp. deterio-
rations) by decreasing (resp. increasing) the supply of the present good.
These changes in the intertemporal terms of trade cause spill-over effects
on country F. Appendix C derives
dU∗
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= − ηΩλ
∗
θ + α
b0,
which reveals that the increase in g makes country F worse (resp. better) off
when Ωb0 > 0 (resp. Ωb0 < 0). With a positive b0(= −b∗0), for example, an
increase in g induces a deterioration (resp. an improvement) in country F’s
intertemporal terms of trade, thereby harming (resp. benefiting) country F.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3: Suppose that country H is as much in the habit of consuming
as country F: ΩH = ΩF = Ω. Then, due to intertemporal terms-of-trade
effects, an increase in fiscal spending g in country H
(i) enhances the country’s own welfare if and only if θα+θηΩb0 > 1; and
(ii) harms country F if and only if Ωb0 > 0.
Remark 4: By using a two-country model, Bianconi (2003) shows the pos-
sibility that an increase in fiscal spending has a reversed immiserizing growth
effect due to changes in the intratemporal terms of trade. He shows that an
increase in a country’s fiscal spending financed by capital taxation contracts
the production frontier in the country, and thereby appreciates the real ex-
change rate, which can improve the asset position and the welfare level of
the country. However, as pointed out in Bianconi (2003, p.26) this reversed
immiserizing growth effect cannot take place when government spending is
financed by a lump-sum tax, and/or when there is only one consumption
good. Proposition 3 shows that with habit formation, fiscal spending can
make the policy implementing country better off by improving the intertem-
poral terms of trade even when the policy is financed by lump-sum taxation
in a single good economy.
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6 Conclusions
We have examined the process of macroeconomic adjustment in a tractable
two-country model of heterogeneous habit forming consumers. Our conclu-
sions can be summarized as follows:
1. To focus on interactive consumption-habit dynamics, we have proposed
to construct the world felicity function and the aggregate habit capital,
which successfully help to characterize intertemporal complementarities
in the two-country equilibrium.
2. External indebtedness depends crucially on international difference in
surplus income, i.e., the effective disposable income that can be allo-
cated for saving under habit formation. This is shown to be consistent
with the existing proposition (e.g., Devereux and Shi 1991) that a coun-
try tends to be a long-run creditor the more patient it is. Our contribu-
tion is that which country is more patient is determined endogenously
from the relative strengths of adjacent complementarity and how much
greater disposable income than the habitual consumption standard they
have.
3. When the initial holding of net foreign assets, and hence the income
re-transfer effect due to interest rate changes are negligible, an increase
in a country’s fiscal spending (i) can increase the initial or steady-state
consumption level of that country, with the other country’s consump-
tion being crowded out; (ii), as in the small country case, necessarily
worsens (resp. improves) the steady-state external asset position if the
country’s preference displays adjacent (resp. distant) complementar-
ity, irrespective of the other country’s preferences; and (iii) has long-run
and short-run spill-over effects on the other country’s consumption, de-
pending crucially on whether the policy implementing country displays
adjacent or distant complementarity.
4. With non-negligible initial net foreign assets, an increase in fiscal spend-
ing in one country can make the country better off and the neighbor
worse off due to (reverse) intertemporal terms-of-trade effects.
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Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
Note first that λ/λ∗ is constant because λ˙t/λt = λ˙
∗
t/λ
∗
t from (5). By elim-
inating c∗ and z∗ using (8) and (12) from the foreign counterpart of (4),
combining the resulting equation and (4) yields:
uc (c, z) + αξ
u∗c (Y − c, Z − z) + αξ∗
=
λ
λ∗
= constant.
By totally differentiating this equation, we obtain:
cˆ = −λ
∗ucz + λu
∗
cz
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
zˆ − αλ
∗
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
ξˆ +
αλ
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
ξˆ
∗
+
λu∗cz
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
Zˆ.
We substitute this equation into (1), (6), and the foreign counterpart of
(6) and eliminate c∗ and z∗ using (8) and (12) from the resulting equation.
Then, from (11), the autonomous dynamic equation system with respect to³
zˆ, ξˆ, ξˆ
∗
, Zˆ
´
is obtained as follows:
z˙ = −α
µ
λ∗ucz + λu
∗
cz
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
+ 1
¶
zˆ − α
2λ∗
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
ξˆ +
α2λ
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
ξˆ
∗
+
αλu∗cz
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
Zˆ,
ξ˙ =
½
ucz (λ
∗ucz + λu
∗
cz)
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
− uzz
¾
zˆ +
µ
θ + α+
αuczλ
∗
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
¶
ξˆ
− αuczλ
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
ξˆ
∗ − λuczu
∗
cz
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
Zˆ, (52)
ξ˙
∗
= −
½
u∗cz (λ
∗ucz + λu
∗
cz)
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
− u∗zz
¾
zˆ − αu
∗
czλ
∗
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
ξˆ
+
µ
θ + α+
αu∗czλ
∗
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
¶
ξˆ
∗
+
µ
λu∗2cz
λ∗ucc + λu∗cc
− u∗zz
¶
Zˆ,
Z˙ = −αZˆ.
From the definitions (13) and (14) of v and ς, respectively, this autonomous
system reduces to (15).
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B Equilibrium solutions
B.1 Dynamics of habit capital z: (18)
The stable roots of dynamics (15) are given by ω and −α as in (16). Letting
m denote (z, ς, Z)0, the general solution to (15) can thus be expressed as
mˆ (t) = A1 exp (ωt) q +A2 exp (−αt)h,
where q ≡ (q1, q2, q3)0 and h ≡ (h1, h2, h3)0 represent the eigen vectors as-
sociated with stable roots ω and −α, respectively. From (15), it is easy to
confirm that q3 = 0. By eliminating A1 exp (ωt) and A2 exp (−αt) from the
three equations in the above vector equation, we obtain
ςˆ =
q2
q1
zˆ +
q1h2 − q2h1
q1h3
Zˆ, (53)
where the coefficients of zˆ and Zˆ can be obtained by exploiting the definition
of the eigenvectors q and h as
q2
q1
= −(ω + α) vcc + αvcz
α2
,
q1h2 − q2h1
q1h3
= − vcc (vczvZZ + vcZvzz)
αvccvzz + (2α+ δ) vccvcz
+
{(ω + α) vcc + αvcz} {αvccvZZ − (2α+ δ) vccvcZ}
α2 (αvccvzz + (2α+ δ) vccvcz)
.
Substituting (53) into the z˙-equation in (15) yields (18).
B.2 The interest rate
From (1) and (4) through (6), the optimal consumption dynamics are given
by
c˙ = − λ
ucc
³
rˆ − φˆ
´
,
where φ represents the rate of time preference,
φˆ =
α (uzz + uzc)
λ
zˆ − α (α+ θ)
λ
ξˆ.
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Substitute (21) into the above Euler equation. The resulting equation can
be solved for rˆ as
rˆ = −ωucc
λ
cˆ+
α (uzz + ucz)
λ
zˆ − α (α+ θ)
λ
ξˆ. (54)
In the above, ξˆ can be obtained from (14),(19), (52), and (53) as
ξˆ = − uccΩ
H
θ + α− ω cˆ+
uzz
θ + 2α
zˆ. (55)
Substituting (55) and (20) successively into (54) yields (25).
B.3 Net foreign assets
Set
bˆ = κ1zˆ + κ2Zˆ. (56)
Differentiating (56) with respect to time t yields
b˙ = κ1z˙ + κ2Z˙. (57)
Since b˙ is given by (7), this equation implies³
b˙ =
´
rˆb0 + rbˆ− cˆ = κ1z˙ + κ2Z˙. (58)
Substitute (18), (19), (20), (25), and (56) into (58). By comparing the coef-
ficients of the resulting equation, we obtain
(ω − r)κ1 = a1b0 −
ω + α
α
,
− (ω + α) (1− δ)κ1 − (r + α)κ2 = a2b0 +
µ
ω + α
α
¶
(1− δ) .
This simultaneous equation can be solved for κ1 and κ2 as
κ1 =
1
r − ω
½
ω + α
α
− b0a1
¾
, (59)
κ2 =
(1− δ) (ω + α)
α (r − ω) +
b0
r + α
½
(1− δ) (ω + α)
(r − ω) a1 + a2
¾
. (60)
Substituting (59) and (60) into (56) yields (30).
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B.4 Welfare
To obtain the welfare level of country H, linearize instantaneous utilities
u (ct, zt) around a steady state and substitute the result into the lifetime
utility function (2) to obtain
U0 =
Z ∞
0
{u (c¯, z¯) + uccˆt + uz zˆt} exp (−θt) dt.
Since, from (21) and (1), cˆt and zˆt are solved as
cˆt = cˆ0 exp (ωt) and zˆt =
µ
zˆ0 −
αcˆ0
ω + α
¶
exp (−αt) + αcˆ0
ω + α
exp (ωt) ,
the lifetime utility is expressed as
U0 =
Z ∞
0
{u (c¯, z¯) + uccˆ0 exp ((ω − θ) t)+
+uz
µ
zˆ0 −
αcˆ0
ω + α
¶
exp (− (α+ θ) t) + αuz cˆ0
ω + α
exp ((ω − θ) t)
¾
dt
=
u (c¯, z¯)
θ
+
cˆ0
ω − θ
µ
uc +
αuz
ω + α
¶
+
uz
α+ θ
µ
zˆ0 −
αcˆ0
ω + α
¶
.
The initial optimal consumption cˆ0 is obtained by setting t = 0 in (20).
Substituting it into the above equation yields (44). Equation (45) can be
obtained in the same way.
C Dynamics with non-zero b0: The identical
degrees of adjacent complementarity
C.1 Solutions
By assuming that the two countries’ preferences exhibit the identical degrees
of adjacent complementarity, ΩH = ΩF = Ω, we shall derive equilibrium
solutions in the case of a nonzero b0. In this case, from (18), (19), (20), (25),
and (30), the equilibrium dynamics are generated by the following equations
z˙ = ωzˆ − (ω + α)(1− δ)Zˆ, (61)
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Z˙ = −αZˆ, (62)
cˆ =
µ
ω + α
α
¶³
zˆ − (1− δ)Zˆ
´
,
c˙ = ωcˆ,
rˆ = ηΩZˆ,
bˆ =
ω + α
α (θ − ω) zˆ −
½
(1− δ) (ω + α)
α (θ − ω) +
b0ηΩ
θ + α
¾
Zˆ. (63)
U0 =
u (z¯, z¯)
θ
+
(ω + α)uc + αuz
α (θ − ω) (z0 − z¯) (64)
− (ω + α) (1− δ)
α(θ + α) (θ − ω) [(θ + α)uc + αuz] (Z0 − Y ) ,
U∗0 =
u∗ (z¯∗, z¯∗)
θ
+
(ω + α)u∗c + αu
∗
z
α (θ − ω) (z
∗
0 − z¯∗) (65)
− (ω + α) δ
α(θ + α) (θ − ω) [(θ + α)u
∗
c + αu
∗
z] (Z0 − Y ) ,
respectively.
Define the effective habit stock e as
e ≡ z − (1− δ)Z. (66)
By using the effective habit stock, the equilibrium dynamics can be summa-
rized as
b˙ = −αbˆ+ (ω + α)
2
α (θ − ω) eˆ, (67)
e˙ = ωeˆ. (68)
Figure 6 illustrates the phase diagram in the (e, b) plane.
Note that (63) can be rewritten in terms of eˆ as
bˆ =
ω + α
α (θ − ω) eˆ−
b0ηΩ
θ + α
Zˆ. (69)
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The steady state equilibrium is determined by the following two schedules,
CC 0 and DD0:
CC 0: b¯− b0 =
ω + α
α (θ − ω) (e¯− e0)−
b0ηΩ
θ + α
(Y − Z0) , (70)
DD0: θb¯ = e¯+ (1− ε)Y + g − y, (71)
where schedule CC 0 is obtained by evaluating (69) at t = 0; and DD0 is
obtained by substituting (66) for c¯ (= z¯) in (35). The two schedules are
illustrated in Figure 6, where schedule CC 0 is positively- (resp. negatively-
) sloping when the world felicity function displays adjacent (resp. distant)
complementarity, Ω > 0 (resp. Ω < 0). It can be easily shown that the slope
of schedule DD0 is larger than that of CC 0;11 and that, when Ω > 0, schedule
CC 0 is steeper than the b˙ = 0 schedule which is obtained by setting b˙ = 0 in
(67).12 The steady-state equilibrium is determined at the intersection of the
two schedules.
C.2 The effect of fiscal spending
The effects of an increase in fiscal spending g on b¯ and e¯ are obtained from
(70) and (71) as
db¯
dg
= −db¯
∗
dg
=
δ (ω + α)
ω (θ + α)
− αη (θ − ω)Ω
ω (θ + α)2
b0, (72)
de¯
dg
=
αδ (θ − ω)
ω (θ + α)
− αθη (θ − ω)Ω
ω (θ + α)2
b0. (73)
As seen by comparing (41) and (72), the first terms on the right hand
sides in these equations represent the same effects as are discussed in Section
4.2 whereas the second terms capture income effects that arise under non-zero
b0 due to interest rate changes. In fact, differentiating (51) by g yields
dr (0)
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= ηΩ, (74)
11The slope of schedule DD0, 1/θ, minus that of CC 0, (ω + α) /α (θ − ω), equals
−ω (θ + α) /αθ (θ − ω), which is positive.
12The slope of schedule CC0, (ω + α) /α (θ − ω), minus that of the b˙ = 0 schedule,
(ω + α)2 /α2 (θ − ω), equals −ω (ω + α) /α2 (θ − ω), which is positive (resp. negative)
when ω + α > 0 (resp. < 0).
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implying that, with adjacent (resp. distant) complementarity, Ω > (resp. <) 0,
ceteris paribus an increase in g causes excess demand (resp. supply) for the
present good, and raises (resp. lowers) the interest rate. From (72), there-
fore, when country H is a creditor, b0 > 0, the increase (resp. decrease) in the
interest rate has an additional positive (resp. negative) effect on steady-state
external asset holding of country H. Consequently, in contrast to the case of
a zero b0, even under adjacent complementarity, an increase in g can enlarge
steady-state external asset holding of country H by increasing interest income
if b0 is positive and sufficiently large.
Figure 7 illustrates such a case by assuming that Ω > 0 and b0 > 0. An
increase in fiscal spending shifts both the CC 0 and DD0 schedules upward.
Due to a dominant interest-income effect, these shifts bring the steady-state
point from E0 to E1 with a higher b¯ and a lower e¯. In transition the effective
habit stock e decreases monotonically whereas net foreign assets increase
non-monotonically.
From (66) and (73), the effects on consumptions and habit capitals are
given by
dc¯
dg
=
dz¯
dg
=
de¯
dg
+ (1− δ) dY
dg
=
δθ (ω + α)
ω (θ + α)
− 1− αθη (θ − ω)Ω
ω (θ + α)2
b0, (75)
dc¯∗
dg
=
dz¯∗
dg
= 1− dc¯
dg
= −δθ (ω + α)
ω (θ + α)
+
αθη (θ − ω)Ω
ω (θ + α)2
b0, (76)
in which the last terms on the right hand sides represent the income effect
of interest rate changes. When Ωb0 > 0, an increase in g increases country
H’s interest income, thereby having a positive effect on c¯ and a negative one
on c¯∗.
The welfare effects are obtained from (64), (65), (75) and (76) as
dU
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= −λ
θ
µ
1− θ
α+ θ
ηΩb0
¶
,
dU∗
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
= − ηΩλ
∗
θ + α
b0,
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implying that
dU
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
T 0⇔ θ
α+ θ
ηΩb0 T 1. (77)
dU∗
dg
¯¯¯¯
ΩH=ΩF=Ω
T 0⇔ Ωb0 S 0. (78)
Equations (74) and (77) reveal that an increase in g benefits country H when
the income effect of interest rate changes is sufficiently large. From (74) and
(78), the spill-over effect on country F’s welfare is positive or negative as the
interest rate revenue of country F is enlarged or reduced by the policy. For
example, when country H is a creditor (b0 > 0) and when preferences display
adjacent complementarity (Ω > 0), an increase in g raises the interest rate
and causes income transfers from country F to H. This makes country F
worse off. If b0 and/or Ω are/is large enough, the increase in fiscal spending
makes country H better off by raising her interest revenues.
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Figure 1.  Equilibrium dynamics 
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Figure 2. Steady-state equilibrium 
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Figure 3. Steady-state effects of an increase in fiscal spending 
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Figure 4. The effects of an increase in fiscal spending when .0>ΩH  
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Figure 5. The effects of an increase in fiscal spending when .0<ΩH  
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Figure 6. Equilibrium dynamics 
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when 0>Ω  and 00 >b . 
1D
